Australian Materialism
A brief inspection into Australian Materialism:
The views of the Australian materialists on the identification of the mind and the body, simply stated, are that states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain. Henceforth these philosophers (for the purpose of this article I will be referring in particular to Smart and Armstrong’s views on the matter) assume the position that all processes of the mind and experiences are due to physical reactions occurring in the brain and that these physical processes can account for the mental states that one may encounter. Smart’s takes a Materialist stance regarding the identification of the mind and body, and a more scientific one at that, believing that everything …show more content…
As mentioned above the materialist perspective adopted by Smart urges us to see identity theory like any other common theoretical identification in science. While smart understands that it is difficult for science to articulate events such as sensations he believes that as essentially everything can be described through science, it is “frankly unbelievable” (Armstrong, 142, 1968) that an explanation of sensations cannot be deductively reached through science. Smart, makes a clear distinction in his explanation of sensations as brain processes and that is, that it is not his hypothesis that sensations, or “reports of sensations such as “aches”, mean the same as brain process X (where X is a brain process)(Smart, 144, 1959). More specifically he elaborates an ache is a report of a process that happens “to be a brain process” (Smart, 144, 1959). These sensations statement that we experience, such as aches and pains, or his preferred example of a orange after image are thus merely reports of something occurring and that something is in fact a brain process. When a person says ‘I see a yellowish-orange after-image’ (Smart, 141, 1959) he is saying something like this: "There is something going on which is like what is going on when I have my eyes open, am awake, and there is an orange illuminated in good light in front of me" (Smart, 149, 1959). In explaining his theory on identity, Smart explores a range …show more content…
The strict mind and brain correlation they assume is highly merited, however, the lack of scientific research and abilities in there time meant their arguments could only go so far. Their arguments stem from a scientific standpoint well ahead of their years. While those sensory outputs such as aches can be ascribed to physical processes in the brain, Materialism still has problems describing those psychological phenomena such as thoughts, beliefs, desires and intentions. A thought experiment conducted personally illustrates my view on the Materialists mind and brain concept. If I were to set up a computer with sensory pads surrounding it completely and programmed the device to scream “ouch” or “stop” (of coarse, both the act of screaming – can a computer scream, or the words used are irrelevant, however, I find personification an interesting concept in this experiment) when it’s hit with such force as to coarse it damage; is it experiencing pain? The answer to which is no. While the hitting of it may coarse damage the purely physical composition of the computer will not allow it to experience pain, or at least not in the sense relevant to humans. These physical processes can be recreated in the brain, as physical functions we now know to enable us to feel pain, the problem there lies in our experiences of things such as hope and ambition
The views of the Australian materialists on the identification of the mind and the body, simply stated, are that states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain. Henceforth these philosophers (for the purpose of this article I will be referring in particular to Smart and Armstrong’s views on the matter) assume the position that all processes of the mind and experiences are due to physical reactions occurring in the brain and that these physical processes can account for the mental states that one may encounter. Smart’s takes a Materialist stance regarding the identification of the mind and body, and a more scientific one at that, believing that everything …show more content…
As mentioned above the materialist perspective adopted by Smart urges us to see identity theory like any other common theoretical identification in science. While smart understands that it is difficult for science to articulate events such as sensations he believes that as essentially everything can be described through science, it is “frankly unbelievable” (Armstrong, 142, 1968) that an explanation of sensations cannot be deductively reached through science. Smart, makes a clear distinction in his explanation of sensations as brain processes and that is, that it is not his hypothesis that sensations, or “reports of sensations such as “aches”, mean the same as brain process X (where X is a brain process)(Smart, 144, 1959). More specifically he elaborates an ache is a report of a process that happens “to be a brain process” (Smart, 144, 1959). These sensations statement that we experience, such as aches and pains, or his preferred example of a orange after image are thus merely reports of something occurring and that something is in fact a brain process. When a person says ‘I see a yellowish-orange after-image’ (Smart, 141, 1959) he is saying something like this: "There is something going on which is like what is going on when I have my eyes open, am awake, and there is an orange illuminated in good light in front of me" (Smart, 149, 1959). In explaining his theory on identity, Smart explores a range …show more content…
The strict mind and brain correlation they assume is highly merited, however, the lack of scientific research and abilities in there time meant their arguments could only go so far. Their arguments stem from a scientific standpoint well ahead of their years. While those sensory outputs such as aches can be ascribed to physical processes in the brain, Materialism still has problems describing those psychological phenomena such as thoughts, beliefs, desires and intentions. A thought experiment conducted personally illustrates my view on the Materialists mind and brain concept. If I were to set up a computer with sensory pads surrounding it completely and programmed the device to scream “ouch” or “stop” (of coarse, both the act of screaming – can a computer scream, or the words used are irrelevant, however, I find personification an interesting concept in this experiment) when it’s hit with such force as to coarse it damage; is it experiencing pain? The answer to which is no. While the hitting of it may coarse damage the purely physical composition of the computer will not allow it to experience pain, or at least not in the sense relevant to humans. These physical processes can be recreated in the brain, as physical functions we now know to enable us to feel pain, the problem there lies in our experiences of things such as hope and ambition