Are good intentions necessary for moral action
Question #2: Are good intentions a necessary component of moral action? How? Why/Why not?
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Student No: #201347697
According to Aquinas, moral action is determined by three components: the object of action, the intention of the subject and circumstance or situation (Curran & McCormick p; 221). Good intentions are purposes or goals, something a person means to do that is right. According to Kantian ethics, good intentions have the most value and are the necessary component for moral action. For example, if a man finds an iPhone and thinks it is right to return it. The intention of the man to return the iPhone is enough to account for moral action. But, consequentialist like Betham believes that the consequence of the moral action determines whether the actions are right or wrong not the intention, even though the intention may be good; the means justifies the end. For example, if the man who finds the iPhone and thinks to return it but forget, his act is morally wrong because the consequence of his action did not bring out a good outcome. The iPhone of the owner is still missing. The consequence of the action seems to be a better determinant for moral action rather than good intentions. Sometimes, no matter how pure the good intentions are, they do not always lead to good outcomes. Good intentions could bring about disaster such as in case of terrorism. People fail to think about the outcome of the intention before acting out. The object and circumstance also play important roles in determining the moral action. Therefore, it cannot be the necessary component of moral action unless the outcome is good. Terrorist to us seem like bad people who should be locked up or worse, deserve to die. Even though, we do not see this, terrorists believe they are fighting for a just cause. For example, the 9/11 attack in 2000, the terrorists believed they were fighting for the rights of Muslims who have experienced hate violence. So, to some people
By:
Student No: #201347697
According to Aquinas, moral action is determined by three components: the object of action, the intention of the subject and circumstance or situation (Curran & McCormick p; 221). Good intentions are purposes or goals, something a person means to do that is right. According to Kantian ethics, good intentions have the most value and are the necessary component for moral action. For example, if a man finds an iPhone and thinks it is right to return it. The intention of the man to return the iPhone is enough to account for moral action. But, consequentialist like Betham believes that the consequence of the moral action determines whether the actions are right or wrong not the intention, even though the intention may be good; the means justifies the end. For example, if the man who finds the iPhone and thinks to return it but forget, his act is morally wrong because the consequence of his action did not bring out a good outcome. The iPhone of the owner is still missing. The consequence of the action seems to be a better determinant for moral action rather than good intentions. Sometimes, no matter how pure the good intentions are, they do not always lead to good outcomes. Good intentions could bring about disaster such as in case of terrorism. People fail to think about the outcome of the intention before acting out. The object and circumstance also play important roles in determining the moral action. Therefore, it cannot be the necessary component of moral action unless the outcome is good. Terrorist to us seem like bad people who should be locked up or worse, deserve to die. Even though, we do not see this, terrorists believe they are fighting for a just cause. For example, the 9/11 attack in 2000, the terrorists believed they were fighting for the rights of Muslims who have experienced hate violence. So, to some people
References: Cahn, S. M. (2014). Exploring ethics: An introductory anthology (3 ed.), NY, New York: Oxford University Press. Curran, C. E., & McCormick, R. A. (1999). The historical development of fundamental moral theology in the United States, Mahwah, New Jersey: Paulist Press