Algerian Wa
Algerian Independence War
1954
Carlo Cavaliere
Causes of War
November 23rd 2012
Colonization of countries by the world leaders proved to be a successful and profitable action that completely abolished human rights of countries that were colonized but lined the pockets of the elite colonizers. Numerous countries were plundered and forced in to being ruled by superior and more powerful elite nations. However, after hundreds of years nations and peoples, who had been colonized, began to mobilize and gain strength in a basic attempt to gain sovereignty and nationhood. The French Colonial Empire was the second-largest empire in the world, directly behind the British Empire, with 12,347,000 squared kilometers. 2,381,741 of those kilometers were a nation, which had been forced into colonization and depression by the French, known as Algeria. In 1954 Algerian people and guerilla movements mobilized and initiated attacks upon the French, which led to a victory in the latter part of the century.
Throughout this paper I will attempt to successfully answer why this war was initiated and caused through two major theoretical bodies. This first theory that will analyze and articulate this war is neoclassical realism, which will focus a great deal on rational calculations and revisionism, while the following theory will be that of . These theories will apply the fundamental factors of their theories to the core facts and aspects of the Algerian War, commonly referred to as the Algerian Revolution. The conflict began in the early morning hours on November 1st 1954, when the FLN Maquisards; commonly known as guerillas, or terrorists as the French referred to them, launched attacks against various parts of Algeria against both military and civilians, where the French were located. The FLN broadcasted a message calling all Muslims to aid in the restoration of the Algerian state. John Talbott, an expert French political analyst illustrates within his book that the
1954
Carlo Cavaliere
Causes of War
November 23rd 2012
Colonization of countries by the world leaders proved to be a successful and profitable action that completely abolished human rights of countries that were colonized but lined the pockets of the elite colonizers. Numerous countries were plundered and forced in to being ruled by superior and more powerful elite nations. However, after hundreds of years nations and peoples, who had been colonized, began to mobilize and gain strength in a basic attempt to gain sovereignty and nationhood. The French Colonial Empire was the second-largest empire in the world, directly behind the British Empire, with 12,347,000 squared kilometers. 2,381,741 of those kilometers were a nation, which had been forced into colonization and depression by the French, known as Algeria. In 1954 Algerian people and guerilla movements mobilized and initiated attacks upon the French, which led to a victory in the latter part of the century.
Throughout this paper I will attempt to successfully answer why this war was initiated and caused through two major theoretical bodies. This first theory that will analyze and articulate this war is neoclassical realism, which will focus a great deal on rational calculations and revisionism, while the following theory will be that of . These theories will apply the fundamental factors of their theories to the core facts and aspects of the Algerian War, commonly referred to as the Algerian Revolution. The conflict began in the early morning hours on November 1st 1954, when the FLN Maquisards; commonly known as guerillas, or terrorists as the French referred to them, launched attacks against various parts of Algeria against both military and civilians, where the French were located. The FLN broadcasted a message calling all Muslims to aid in the restoration of the Algerian state. John Talbott, an expert French political analyst illustrates within his book that the
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