Alfonso Lopez Case Summary
Perhaps one of the most seminal Supreme Court decisions was the case of United States v. Alfonso Lopez (1995). After nearly a half-century of decisions by the Court in favor of expanded federal power via the Constitution’s Interstate Commerce Clause, the Justices issued a ruling limiting the reach of Congress, signaling a seismic shift on the Court’s interpretation of the Clause. The Court’s decision also sent a strong statement to Congress regarding the legislative body’s jurisdiction over a bevy of activities with a nexus to interstate commerce — from gun control to environmental protection to education. In March 1992, Alfonso D. Lopez, an 18-year-old male, was caught carrying an unloaded, concealed weapon at his Texas high school. Lopez
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In a 5-4 vote, Justice William Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion for the Court, delivering a strong blow to proponents of expanded federal power . Rehnquist argued that the pertinent federal statute was a criminal code, not an economic-related law. The United States Government’s argument “would bid fair to convert Congressional authority under the commerce clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the states,” Rehnquist said. “If we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard-pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.” In other words, Rehnquist understood the need to draw boundaries between federal and state power and felt that the federal statute in this instance was a clear infringement on those bounds. According to his opinion, firearms in school zones are neither conduits to nor instruments of interstate commerce, and thus, are not in the jurisdiction of the federal government to regulate. Moreover, Rehnquist stated that firearms in schools neither substantially affect nor substantially relate to interstate commerce. The Court also rejected the notion that firearms in school zones substantially impact the economy. However, despite the plethora of prior rulings in favor of an expanded interpretation of the Commerce Clause, this case did not revert any prior rulings regarding the meaning of the clause. Rehnquist wrote: “The broad language in these opinions has suggested the possibility of additional expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further. To do so would require us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not presuppose something not enumerated, cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, supra, at 195, and that
In a 5-4 vote, Justice William Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion for the Court, delivering a strong blow to proponents of expanded federal power . Rehnquist argued that the pertinent federal statute was a criminal code, not an economic-related law. The United States Government’s argument “would bid fair to convert Congressional authority under the commerce clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the states,” Rehnquist said. “If we were to accept the Government's arguments, we are hard-pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.” In other words, Rehnquist understood the need to draw boundaries between federal and state power and felt that the federal statute in this instance was a clear infringement on those bounds. According to his opinion, firearms in school zones are neither conduits to nor instruments of interstate commerce, and thus, are not in the jurisdiction of the federal government to regulate. Moreover, Rehnquist stated that firearms in schools neither substantially affect nor substantially relate to interstate commerce. The Court also rejected the notion that firearms in school zones substantially impact the economy. However, despite the plethora of prior rulings in favor of an expanded interpretation of the Commerce Clause, this case did not revert any prior rulings regarding the meaning of the clause. Rehnquist wrote: “The broad language in these opinions has suggested the possibility of additional expansion, but we decline here to proceed any further. To do so would require us to conclude that the Constitution's enumeration of powers does not presuppose something not enumerated, cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, supra, at 195, and that