9/11, FOREIGN THREATS, POLITICAL LEGITIMACY, AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
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9/11, FOREIGN THREATS, POLITICAL LEGITIMACY, AND
DEMOCRATIC SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
By Jon D. Wisman1
Inter arma silent leges (“In times of war, the laws are silent.”
Ancient Roman maxim)
“Of all the enemies of public liberty, war is perhaps the most to be dreaded....armies, debts and taxes are the known instruments for bringing the many under the domination of the few....No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare” (Madison 1795: 491).
“In politics, the emotions that really sway voters are hate, hope and fear or anxiety” (Western 2007).
“Since 9/11, we have created the very government the framers feared: a government with sweeping and largely unchecked powers resting on the hope they will be used wisely” (Turley 2012: B4).
ABSTRACT: This article reassesses the political reaction in the United States to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in terms of economics and evolutionary biology. The fact that war and its threat were ever-present in human evolution resulted in two social propensities that render society vulnerable to political manipulation. External threats dramatically heighten social cohesion as well as loyalty to leaders.
In pre-state social groupings, all members could clearly witness and judge the nature of an external threat.
And because leaders had to spearhead any response, they were most vulnerable to injury or death. In modern highly complex societies, by contrast, the nature of threats is less transparent, and leaders can command far from immediate danger. Consequently, in modern times, leaders can be tempted, especially in times of economic dysfunction, to generate fear of an external threat to rally support and detract attention from otherwise inadequate leadership. This paper explores these dynamics in the context of post-9/11. It concludes with reflections on the potential of democratic institutions and practices to lessen the potential for political leaders to exploit their advantages
9/11, FOREIGN THREATS, POLITICAL LEGITIMACY, AND
DEMOCRATIC SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
By Jon D. Wisman1
Inter arma silent leges (“In times of war, the laws are silent.”
Ancient Roman maxim)
“Of all the enemies of public liberty, war is perhaps the most to be dreaded....armies, debts and taxes are the known instruments for bringing the many under the domination of the few....No nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare” (Madison 1795: 491).
“In politics, the emotions that really sway voters are hate, hope and fear or anxiety” (Western 2007).
“Since 9/11, we have created the very government the framers feared: a government with sweeping and largely unchecked powers resting on the hope they will be used wisely” (Turley 2012: B4).
ABSTRACT: This article reassesses the political reaction in the United States to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in terms of economics and evolutionary biology. The fact that war and its threat were ever-present in human evolution resulted in two social propensities that render society vulnerable to political manipulation. External threats dramatically heighten social cohesion as well as loyalty to leaders.
In pre-state social groupings, all members could clearly witness and judge the nature of an external threat.
And because leaders had to spearhead any response, they were most vulnerable to injury or death. In modern highly complex societies, by contrast, the nature of threats is less transparent, and leaders can command far from immediate danger. Consequently, in modern times, leaders can be tempted, especially in times of economic dysfunction, to generate fear of an external threat to rally support and detract attention from otherwise inadequate leadership. This paper explores these dynamics in the context of post-9/11. It concludes with reflections on the potential of democratic institutions and practices to lessen the potential for political leaders to exploit their advantages
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