6.1 Kvanvig Knowledge From Falsehoods?
Crucial to the present account is the thesis that G-justification does not essentially consist of certain falsehoods in a way that mere justification does. In this section, I consider and reply to two possible objections to this thesis.
6.1 Kvanvig’s Objection
Kvanvig has discussed a similar account of knowledge according to which knowledge requires “insulation from error”. On this view, bodies of evidence of knowledge do not “contain, presuppose, or confirm falsehoods” (Kvanvig 2003, 122). Kvanvig argues that the insulation-from-error account is of no use in solving the value problem since it is not even a correct account of knowledge. He offers two reasons.
Firstly, the preface paradox and the lottery paradox show that our bodies of evidence …show more content…
I have argued that knowledge may contain or presuppose falsehoods only if those falsehoods are not essential. This view is incompatible with a view of knowledge advanced by Ted Warfield (2005). According to Warfield, there are cases of knowledge from falsehood, according to which one may acquire inferential knowledge based on of false relevant premises (2005, 405). The following is one of Warfield’s examples:
Meeting. I have a 7pm meeting and extreme confidence in the accuracy of my fancy watch. Having lost track of the time and wanting to arrive on time for the meeting, I look carefully at my watch. I reason: ‘It is exactly 2:58pm; therefore I am not late for my 7pm meeting’. Again I know my conclusion, but as it happens it’s exactly 2:56pm, not 2:58pm. (Warfield 2005, 408)
Meeting describes how the subject can come to know that she is not late for her 7 pm meeting by inferring from a false premise, i.e., it is exactly 2:58 pm. But does it show that the subject’s knowledge is essentially dependent on falsehood? Not …show more content…
At best, Dog shows that an inferential belief based on a certain falsehood is not sufficient for knowledge. But this last claim is consistent with the present account as the view does not claim that containing or presupposing certain falsehoods is a sufficient condition for G-justification. In fact, on the present account, the agent in Dog does not know that there is at least one animal in the yard since his justification essentially contains the falsehood that there is a dog in the yard—if he were to realize the falsehood, he would have discarded his
6.1 Kvanvig’s Objection
Kvanvig has discussed a similar account of knowledge according to which knowledge requires “insulation from error”. On this view, bodies of evidence of knowledge do not “contain, presuppose, or confirm falsehoods” (Kvanvig 2003, 122). Kvanvig argues that the insulation-from-error account is of no use in solving the value problem since it is not even a correct account of knowledge. He offers two reasons.
Firstly, the preface paradox and the lottery paradox show that our bodies of evidence …show more content…
I have argued that knowledge may contain or presuppose falsehoods only if those falsehoods are not essential. This view is incompatible with a view of knowledge advanced by Ted Warfield (2005). According to Warfield, there are cases of knowledge from falsehood, according to which one may acquire inferential knowledge based on of false relevant premises (2005, 405). The following is one of Warfield’s examples:
Meeting. I have a 7pm meeting and extreme confidence in the accuracy of my fancy watch. Having lost track of the time and wanting to arrive on time for the meeting, I look carefully at my watch. I reason: ‘It is exactly 2:58pm; therefore I am not late for my 7pm meeting’. Again I know my conclusion, but as it happens it’s exactly 2:56pm, not 2:58pm. (Warfield 2005, 408)
Meeting describes how the subject can come to know that she is not late for her 7 pm meeting by inferring from a false premise, i.e., it is exactly 2:58 pm. But does it show that the subject’s knowledge is essentially dependent on falsehood? Not …show more content…
At best, Dog shows that an inferential belief based on a certain falsehood is not sufficient for knowledge. But this last claim is consistent with the present account as the view does not claim that containing or presupposing certain falsehoods is a sufficient condition for G-justification. In fact, on the present account, the agent in Dog does not know that there is at least one animal in the yard since his justification essentially contains the falsehood that there is a dog in the yard—if he were to realize the falsehood, he would have discarded his